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Developing a duopoly model with unemployment caused by a rigid
wage, this paper examines whether FDI bene¯ts both the host and
source countries. We show that in contrast to the full employment case
this win-win FDI is possible since the employment-creating e®ect of FDI
can dominate the negative e®ect of pro¯t-shifting. Then, we examine the
e®ect of exchange rates, which are one of the most in°uential factors of
exports/FDI, and ¯nd that appreciation of the host country's currency
monotonically increases the above win-win possibility of FDI.
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1 Introduction
Foreign direct investments (FDIs) and multinational ¯rms have been
playing a growing role in the contemporary world economy. For instance,
UNCTAD (2014, p.2) provides evidence reporting that `global FDI °ows
rose by 9 per cent in 2013 to $1.45 trillion, up from $1.33 trillion in 2012
¢ ¢ ¢ . FDI in°ows increased in all major economic groupings- developed,
developing, and transition economies.' The increased importance of FDI
has generated a number of studies that theoretically and/or empirically
examine the determinants and consequences of FDI.1)
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Hyogo, 662-8501, Japan. Tel: +81-798-54-7066. Fax: +81-798-51-0944. E-mail:
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1) Markusen (1995, 2002, 2011) and Blonigen (2005) provide a comprehensive survey
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While this paper belongs to this strand of literature, we pay special at-
tention to the implications of unemployment and exchange rates for FDI,
both of which have received small attention particularly in the theoretical
literature.2) Speci¯cally, by constructing a duopoly model that incorpo-
rates unemployment in the host country and exchange rates, we seek the
condition under which a source ¯rm chooses FDI instead of exports, and
the host country gains from FDI. The reasons for allowing for unemploy-
ment and exchange rates are as follows. For one thing, employment e®ects
in the host country are signi¯cant as the existing empirical literature ¯nds
out.3) As compared with the empirical literature that suggests a signi¯cant
e®ect of FDI on employment, the theoretical literature mostly overlooks it
by assuming full employment. For another thing, exchange rates are em-
pirically shown to be an important determinant of FDI. In a seminal work,
Froot and Stein (1991) demonstrate that appreciation of the host country's
currency increases inward FDI.4) Takagi and Shi (2011), moreover, empir-
ically ¯nd a positive relationship between the Japanese yen appreciation
and Japan's FDI out°ows. These studies clearly suggest the relevance of
unemployment and exchange rates in studying the determinant and conse-
quence of FDI not only at the theoretical level as well as at the empirical
level. With these motivations in mind, this paper provides a simple theory
on the theoretical and empirical literature, respectively. See, furthermore, Antlas
and Yeaple (2014) for a more updated review.
2) Unemployment and exchange rates are a macroeconomic variable, and so we need
a macroeconomic model in order to endogenize them. However, we simply assume
that exchange rates are exogenous and unemployment is caused by an exogenously
high wage because a full macroeconomic model makes our focus less transparent.
3) Table A1 in Kingombe (2002) summarizes the results of the empirical studies pub-
lished by 2000 whereas more recent papers are summarized in Table 2 in Hoang
and Binh (2014). Both of these papers ¯nd that most empirical evidence suggests
a positive employment e®ect of FDI.
4) Empirical studies of FDI determinants including Froot and Stein (1991) are com-
prehensively reviewed in Blonigen (2005).
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that is capable of discussing the e®ect of FDI. Making use of a duopoly
model with unemployment and exchange rates, we establish two results.
First, FDI can be win-win in the sense that it improves both the source
¯rm's pro¯t and the host country's welfare, which never holds in the full
employment model. Second, while an appreciation of the host country's
currency reduces the incentive to FDI of the foreign ¯rm, but it mono-
tonically increases the above possibility of win-win FDI. These theoretical
predictions may provide a sound support for the empirical evidence above.
As mentioned earlier, the theoretical literature on FDI in the presence
of unemployment is much smaller than the empirical literature. To our
knowledge, Brander and Spencer (1987) are the ¯rst to examine the impli-
cation of unemployment for FDI in a foreign monopoly model. Their model
is extended to an oligopoly model by Lahiri and Ono (1998a, b, 2003a, b)
to consider the e®ects of FDI policies, e.g., local content requirement. Dei
(1990), Horstmann and Markusen (1992) and Brainard (1997), on the other
hand, explore the choice between exports and FDI in a duopoly model with
full employment, commonly showing that FDI is chosen if the ¯xed cost
associated with FDI is small relative to a trade barrier such as transport
costs and import tari®s. Our model is similar to the model of these pre-
decessors, but we ignore trade costs and ¯xed costs of FDI, and introduce
exchange rates instead in order to isolate the implication of exchange rates.
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents a model, and de-
rives the equilibrium outcome under export and FDI regimes. Section 3
considers the e®ect of exchange rates on the win-win possibility of FDI
mentioned above. Section 4 concludes. Appendix 1 o®ers a detailed proof
of the ¯rst main result, and Appendix 2 addresses the full employment case
for comparison with the unemployment case in the main text.
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2 Model
Suppose a domestic duopoly in which a Home ¯rm (¯rm X) and a Foreign
¯rm (¯rm Y) compete with a Cournot conjecture.5) We modify the model
in two ways. First, unemployment prevails in the Home labor market due
to a highly ¯xed wage rate w. Second, we allow an exchange rate e, which
measures the value of the Home currency in terms of the Foreign currency
so that a rise (resp. fall) in e represents depreciation (resp. appreciation)
of the Home currency.
Assuming that Good Z is a numeraire good, and that the amount of
labor to produce it is denoted by f(z), the pro¯t is de¯ned by z¡wf(z).6)
Pro¯t maximization by price-taking ¯rms leads to the ¯rst-order condition
1¡ wf 0(z) = 0, from which the equilibrium output of Good Z is obtained
as z = f
0¡1(1=w) ´ Á(w).
Domestic demand of the non-numeraire good is represented by a linear
inverse demand function p = a ¡ x ¡ y; a > w, and producing one unit of
this good requires one unit of labor. Then, the pro¯t of the Home ¯rm is
de¯ned by
px¡ wx = (a¡ x¡ y)x¡ wx: (1)
The pro¯t of the Foreign ¯rm is de¯ned in two ways as follows.7)
py
e
¡ w¤y = (a¡ x¡ y)y
e
¡ w¤y under exports (2)
py ¡ wy
e
=
(a¡ x¡ y)y ¡ wy
e
under FDI; (3)
where w¤ is the wage rate in Foreign. This completes describing the key
ingredients of the model.
5) Dornbusch (1987) is the ¯rst to discuss some implications of exchange rates in a
duopoly model. We basically follow his setting except for incorporating FDI and
unemployment.
6) Note that the price of Good Z is one.
7) Note from Eqs. (2) and (3), e can be regarded as an iceberg transport cost by
assuming that e > 1 units of good must be shipped in order to deliver one unit.
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Let us begin solving the model with the export case where the Foreign
¯rm chooses output to maximize (2). Then, each ¯rm's ¯rst-order condi-
tions for pro¯t maximization are
a¡ w ¡ 2x¡ y = 0; a¡ x¡ 2y
e
¡ w¤ = 0;
and thus the Cournot equilibrium outputs are
xE =
a¡ 2w + ew¤
3
; yE =
a+ w ¡ 2ew¤
3
; (4)
where superscript E represents the exporting equilibrium. Substituting
these into (2), the Foreign ¯rm's equilibrium pro¯t ¼EY becomes
¼EY =
1
e

a+ w ¡ 2ew¤
3
2
: (5)
Home welfare is now computed. Since we have implicitly assumed a quasi-
linear utility function, Home welfare is given by a sum of consumer surplus
CS and national income I, each of which is derived as follows.
CSE ´ (x+ y)
2
2
=
1
2

2a¡ w ¡ ew¤
3
2
(6)
IE ´ px¡ wx| {z }
(¯rm X's pro¯t)
+ z ¡ wf(z)| {z }
(sector Z's pro¯t)
+ wx|{z}
(labor income in ¯rm X)
+ wf(z)| {z }
(labor income in sector Z)
= px+ z = (a¡ x¡ y)x+ Á(w)
=
(a+ w + ew¤)(a¡ 2w + ew¤)
9
+ Á(w): (7)
Using (6) and (7), Home welfare in the export case is given by WE =
CSE + IE .
Let us turn to the other case in which the Foreign ¯rm chooses FDI to
maximize (3). Solving the ¯rst-order conditions for pro¯t maximization,
the equilibrium outputs, the Foreign ¯rm's pro¯t, Home's consumer surplus
and national income are respectively obtained as follows.8)
8) Note that in this case the labor income paid by the Foreign ¯rm wy contributes
to the national income of Home.
| 41 |
?????? 69 ?? 3 ?
xF = yF =
a¡ w
3
; ¼FY =
1
e
a¡ w
3
2
(8)
CSF =
1
2

2(a¡ w)
3
2
; IF =
(a+ 5w)(a¡ w)
9
+ Á(w); (9)
where superscript F refers to the FDI equilibrium. Home's welfare in the
present case is given by WF = CSF + IF .
Having derived the endogenous variables in each case, we proceed to ob-
taining the condition under which the Foreign ¯rm prefers FDI to exports,
and Home gains from FDI. This task is made by comparing the Foreign
¯rm's pro¯ts and Home's welfare levels. It is easy to show that the Foreign
¯rm chooses FDI
w¤ >
w
e
: (10)
This inequality simply states that FDI is chosen if marginal cost under
FDI (w=e) is smaller than that under exports (w¤).
Let us turn to deriving the condition for FDI to be welfare-superior to
exports. This is the case if and only if WF > WE , which is rewritten by
1
2

2(a¡ w)
3
2
+
(a+ 5w)(a¡ w)
9
+ Á(w)
>
1
2

2a¡ w ¡ ew¤
3
2
+
(a+ w + ew¤)(a¡ 2w + ew¤)
9
+ Á(w);
from (6), (7) and (9). Rearranging this inequality, we have a quadratic
inequality of w¤:
e2 (w¤)2 ¡ 2aw + w2
6
< 0;
the solution of which is
w¤ <
p
2aw ¡ w2
e
: (11)
Combining conditions (10) and (11), we have a combination of (w;w¤)
such that FDI bene¯ts both the Foreign ¯rm and Home. This result is
summarized in:
Proposition 1. If (w;w¤) is inside the shaded area in Figure 1, FDI is
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a
w∗
w
O
a
5
y = 0
condition (10)
condition (11)
win-win in the sense that it raises the Foreign ¯rm's pro¯t and Home's
welfare relative to exports.
Proof. See Appendix 1. jj
The intuitions behind this result are as follows. From the viewpoint of
the Foreign ¯rm, FDI is more pro¯table than exports if exporting is more
costly than FDI, i.e., w¤ > w=e. In Figure 1, the Foreign ¯rm ¯nds it
indi®erent to choose either of exports and FDI if (w;w¤) is on the upward-
sloping straight line, and it opts for FDI if (w;w¤) is above this line.
In discussing the e®ect of FDI on Home welfare, it is convenient to note
that FDI has two con°icting e®ects. First, if the Foreign ¯rm chooses FDI,
the Foreign ¯rm's output increases and the Home ¯rm's output decreases.9)
9) Subtracting the output under exports from that under FDI yields xF ¡ xE =
(w¡ew¤)=3 < 0 and yF ¡yE = ¡2(w¡ew¤)=3 > 0 if FDI is chosen, i.e., w < ew¤.
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In other words, FDI negatively a®ects Home welfare by shifting the pro¯ts
from Home to Foreign. Second, FDI has a positive e®ect on Home welfare
since employment is created by FDI.10) The strictly concave locus in Figure
1 depicts the relative magnitude of these two e®ects. When w¤ is so small
that (w;w¤) is below this locus, the employment-creating e®ect dominates
the pro¯t-shifting e®ect, leading to a welfare gain of Home. As brie°y
demonstrated in Appendix 2, this possibility no longer exists in the full
employment case because the employment-creating e®ect is absent.
3 E®ect of Exchange Rate
The previous section has established the existence of a win-win possibil-
ity of FDI, which contrasts with the full employment situation. We devote
this section to examining how exchange rates a®ect this possibility. This
question is not only theoretically interesting but also practically important
since even a small change in exchange rates has a considerable impact par-
ticularly on the countries employing a °oating exchange rate. Our result
is:
Proposition 2. The win-win possibility of FDI monotonically rises as the
host country's currency appreciates.
Proof. Noting that the shaded area in Figure 1 is equal toZ a
5
0
p
2aw ¡ w2
e
¡ w
e

dw +
Z a
a
5
a+ w
2e
¡ w
e

dw
=
1
e
Z a
5
0
hp
2aw ¡ w2 ¡ w
i
dw +
4a2
25e
;
which obviously decreases with e. To put it another way, the win-win set
10) The di®erence between the amounts of labor under FDI and exports is
 
xF + yF
¡
xE = (a¡ ew¤)=3 > 0.
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increase as e falls, i.e., the Home currency appreciates.jj
Appreciation of the host country's currency has a con°icting e®ect on
the world welfare. First, from the point of view of the Foreign country,
appreciation of the host country's currency makes FDI less attractive be-
cause it reduces the pro¯t from FDI by raising the cost of employing Home
labor, w=e. This is also con¯rmed in Figure 1; when e declines, the slope of
the straight line shifts up, and that the area where FDI is chosen becomes
smaller.
The e®ect on Home welfare is, by contrast, more complicated. As men-
tioned right above, if the Home currency appreciates, the Foreign ¯rm
prefers exports more to FDI, and increases its export. While the Home
¯rm contracts output, total supply and consumer surplus of Home in-
creases since the output expansion of the Foreign ¯rm is much larger than
the reduction in the Home ¯rm's output. This contributes to a welfare im-
provement of Home. However, the Foreign ¯rm's shift from FDI to exports
induced by the appreciation of the Home currency has a negative e®ect on
the Home national income because decreased FDI leads to increased unem-
ployment. Appreciation of the Home currency has these competing e®ects,
but the former positive e®ect dominates the latter negative e®ect, thereby
resulting in a welfare improvement of Home. This is checked by looking
at Figure 1 in which the strictly-concave locus that depicts condition (11)
shifts up as e falls.11)
Summarizing the foregoing arguments, appreciation of the Home cur-
rency (fall in e) increases Home's gains from FDI, but decreases Foreign's
gains from FDI. The above proposition states that the net e®ect on the
win-win possibility becomes positive since the positive e®ect on the host
11) Note that the right-hand side of (11) is decreasing in e.
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country dominates the negative e®ect on the source country.
Remark. As noted in Footnote 7, one can regard e as an iceberg transport
cost rather than an exchange rate. This case should be discussed separately
since transport costs considerably a®ect the FDI decision in reality. If we
suppose that e stands for a transport cost, a reduction in it has two oppo-
site e®ect on world welfare. When the transport cost falls, the Foreign ¯rm
expands output and the Home ¯rm contracts output, but Home consumer
surplus increases because total output increases. However, transport cost
reductions lead the Foreign ¯rm to choose exporting, which, in turn, has
a negative e®ect on Home welfare by increasing unemployment. Accord-
ing to Proposition 2. the former positive e®ect of trade cost reductions
dominates the latter negative e®ect, resulting in world welfare gains.
4 Conclusion
Incorporating unemployment into a simple duopoly model, we have
shown an interesting possibility that FDI can increase welfare of both the
source country and the host country. The key behind this ¯nding lies in the
employment-creating e®ect of FDI, which has seemingly been overlooked
in the theoretical literature on FDI. Our ¯nding may well explain rapid
growth of FDI over the last few decades. In addition, we have demonstrated
that appreciation of the host country's currency monotonically increases
this possibility.
We have chosen the simplest partial equilibrium model so as to focus
on the implications of unemployment and exchange rates. There are, of
course, a number of open questions. In this conclusion, we mention only
two of them. First, it is arguably most interesting to reconsider our re-
sults in a context of tari®-jumping FDI. In a companion paper, we have
shown the validity of our results in the presence of import tari®s. Another
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promising direction is to reexamine our arguments by taking into account
general equilibrium e®ects. One natural strategy for this purpose is to
apply Neary's (2009) general oligopolistic equilibrium model, which has
received increasing attention in trade theory. These tasks are left as future
research agenda.
Appendix 1: Proof of Proposition 1
It is evident from Eq. (10) that FDI is more pro¯table than exports if
and only if (w;w¤) is above the straight line in Figure 1, whose slope of
1=e.
Condition (11) is satis¯ed if and only if (w;w¤) is below the strictly
concave locus in Figure 1. In what follows, some detailed properties of this
locus are obtained. Let us denote the right-hand side of (11) by
F (w; e) ´
p
2aw ¡ w2
e
:
Then, we know that F (0; e) = 0 and F (a; e) = a=e > 0. Di®erentiating
F (¢) with respect to w yields
Fw(w; e) ´ @F (w; e)
@w
= (a¡ w)  2aw ¡ w2¡ 12 ;
and thus we have Fw(0; e) = 1 and Fw(a; e) = 0. Furthermore, this
function is strictly concave in w because the second derivative of F (¢)
becomes
Fww(w; e) ´ @
2F (w; e)
@w2
= ¡a2  2aw ¡ w2¡ 32 < 0;
for any w 2 [0; a]. Finally, from the assumption that a > w, the locus of
F (w; e) is always above the straight line that illustrates condition (10).
Appendix 2: The Full Employment Case
This appendix brie°y addresses the case of full employment. For sim-
plicity, one unit of labor is assumed to produce one unit of good Z so that
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the wage rate in Home is one. Then, the equilibrium variables in the export
regime are obtained as
xE =
a¡ 2 + ew¤
3
; yE =
a+ 1¡ 2ew¤
3
CSE =
1
2

2a¡ 1¡ ew¤
3
2
(12)
¼EX =

a¡ 2 + ew¤
3
2
; ¼EY =
1
e

a+ 1¡ 2ew¤
3
2
; (13)
and Home welfare is measured by WE = CSE + ¼EX . The equilibrium
variables in the FDI case are
xF = yF =
a¡ 1
3
; CSF =
1
2

2(a¡ 1)
3
2
(14)
¼FX =

a¡ 1
3
2
; ¼FY =
1
e

a¡ 1
3
2
: (15)
Comparing the Foreign ¯rm's pro¯ts in (13) and (15), FDI yields a
larger pro¯t if and only if w¤ > 1=e, i.e., marginal cost of exporting (w¤)
is higher than that of FDI (1=e). In contrast, a few manipulations allow
us to know that WE > WF holds for any parameter. In other words, it is
impossible for FDI to be welfare-superior to exports in the present case of
full employment.
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